Recantations

Luther, Augustine, and undoubtedly others, felt the need to, when their views changed, write confessions or recantations of those previously held beliefs. I suppose its only fair that I do the same.

On the inspiration of the Bible
I previously wrote that, “With those obvious contradictions (errors) in mind, I don’t see how we can rightly claim that the Bible is inerrant.”

I confess and recant this sinful belief. I now hold to inerrancy of the original texts, and the sufficiency of the Scriptures.

On the creation of the universe
I previously wrote that, “the church has, in the past, claimed that the Bible asserts scientific truth when, in fact, it does not. I believe this is the case in regards to evolution.” I also wrote, in a comment, that I would defend the validity of the theory of evolution.

I confess and recant this sinful belief. I now hold to a literal six-day creation.

—————

I also confess and recant the sinful arrogance with which I have posted, of late. In two particular posts, I displayed an attitude of sinful pride, and denied it even when called out on it. I underhandedly attacked my fellow Christians, and then later lauged at the lack of unity found within Christianity, and so I am a hypocrite.

O God,
light of the minds that know you,
life of the souls that love you,
strength of the thoughts that seek you:
Help us so to know you
that we may truly love you,
so to love you
that we may fully serve you,
whose service is perfect freedom;
through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen

This day in history…

I just remembered something rather significant this past Sunday: it was at TLC last year that I purchased Debating Calvinism. Little did I know how drastically that would affect my life, and where it would take me a year later…

I bought it mostly out of curiosity, and honestly expected the non-Calvinist (Dave Hunt) to trounce the Calvinist (James White). In the end, it was quite the opposite and I became (mostly) convinced of the truth of Calvinism.

I remember wondering then why I had never heard of Calvinism before. I still don’t know the answer.

And so I became a self-professed Calvinist, but I also began to wonder, if I had missed such truth that is Calvinism, what else have I missed? I investigated more and found Calvinism to be only a small part of a larger belief set: Reformed theology. “Maybe, since they nailed Calvinism, they got it right in a few more areas too,” I remember thinking. And that is where I am now. I tentatively call myself a Presbyterian, not being wholly convinced of paedobaptism (though I blame some of that on the fact that I was born and raised Baptist).

Most recently I’ve been amazed by the coherency which Reformed theology gives to the Bible. God had a plan from the beginning of the world and has been carrying it out since then, and that’s something at which non-Reformed theology fails miserably. And not only that, but Reformed theology gives Christianity a complete system of thought, including a totally non-secular epistemology. I’ve yet to see any non-Reformed theologian even attempt that.

Interesting how much different a year can make.

A Point Made Humorously

[This illustration originally appeared in Unity magazine, and has been adapted and edited slightly.]

I was walking across a bridge recently when I spied a guy who looked like he was ready to jump off. So, I thought I’d try to stall him until the authorities showed up.

“Don’t jump!” I said.

“Why not? Nobody loves me,” he answered.

“God loves you. You believe in God, don’t you?”

“Yes, I believe in God.”

“Good. Are you a Christian or Jew?”

“Christian.”

“Me too! Protestant or Catholic?”

“Neither.”

“What, then?”

“Baptist.” [Editor’s note: I love how he considers Baptists neither Protestant nor Catholic.]

“Me too! Independent Baptist or Southern Baptist?”

“Independent Baptist.”

“Me too! New Evangelical/Moderate Independent Baptist or Conservative Independent Baptist?”

“Conservative Independent Baptist.”

“Me too! Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist or Lose-Your-Salvation Arminian Conservative Independent Baptist?”

“Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist.”

“Me too! Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist or Historical Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist?”

“Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist.”

“Me too! KJV-only Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist or Modern-Versions Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist?”

“Modern-Versions Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist.”

“Me too! Hymn-singing Modern-Versions Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist or Chorus-singing Modern-Versions Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist?”

“Chorus-singing Modern-Versions Dispensational Pre-mil Calvinistic Conservative Independent Baptist.”

“You heretic!” I cried. And I pushed him over.

---

My dad used this illustration a few weeks back in church, and I think it very effectively makes the point that we, as Christians, can be so drastically opposed to the ecumenical movement that we separate ourselves from those who may believe slightly different and label them heretics.

Baptists especially, it seems, have this one-denomination church mind where all other orthodox denominations (even fellow Baptists of a different flavor!) are shunned. Fraternizing with the enemy (i.e., other believers) is strictly prohibited. Whatever happened to unity among the body?

This is an area in which I highly respect most Presbyterian, Anglican, Episcopal, etc., churches: they often have a much better understand of the idea that, though we may believe differently, salvation is not limited to just one or two denominations.

My case in point: the Presbyterian Church in America, at a recent conference, had Reformed Baptist John Piper speak. He (obviously) isn’t part of the PCA or even a Presbyterian but he was a key speaker! That would never be accepted in at a Baptist conference or church. Why? Because, anyone who doesn’t match our doctrinal statement to the last dot and tittle are heretics who have no place in our sole-truth church.

Just to be even more explicit what I’m trying to say: I’m not trying to push lovey-dovey Let’s-Love-God-And-Forget-Doctrine-ism (I think I’d be one of the last people to throw doctrine out the door), but for crying out loud, we all need to realize a heck of a lot more people will be in heaven than belonged to our church or denomination.

We’re supposed to be unified as the body of Christ. Let’s at least try to live up to that.

One faith, one hope, one God.

The Christian Brainwashing?

In a recent post in the blog, “Goose the Antithesis,” Francois Tremblay emotionally pleaded with Christians to “keep your filthy hands away from innocent children ! [sic]” and asked that we, Christians, stop the “Christian brainwashing and mental abuse of children.” Tremblay goes on to complain that Christians are terrible people because they do not limit their target audience to “consenting adults” but also spread it to children.

Well, yes. I won’t disagree that we teach children as well as adults. However, I seriously doubt he would have any qualms with teaching children his idea of supposed neutrality (i.e., atheism) – and that very concept of neutrality is only neutral if he begs the question by assuming atheism to be true to begin with.

The problem comes down to this: there is no “neutral” worldview which we can teach children unless we somehow teach them all beliefs without any bias. However, that solution itself would raise two problems: 1) teaching without bias is practically impossible; 2) teaching the equality of worldviews is unbiblical.

Since those two solutions turn out to self-destruct, we must continue to do what society has done for thousands of years: allow the child’s parents to decide what worldview they will attempt to instill in the child, and then allow the child to make their own choice once they become an adult.

Plainly, then, Tremblay’s rant was literally one ironic passage after another, telling Christians not to push their ideas on “innocent” children while implying that instead we should push his ideas on “innocent” children. It’s a classic persuasive essay whose case lies entirely on his use of emotion-packed words and a victim-abuser-defender appeal and because of that it fails entirely once logic is brought in. Nice try, and better luck next time.

In response… 2

Traditional Calvinism is composed of five points which form the acrostic “TULIP.” The first point, “T”, stands for “Total Depravity.” What is meant by this is the belief that no person will, by his own natural will, come to God because of his extremely fallen condition. This does not mean that man is as evil as possible, but rather that The Fall has removed man’s desire to choose God over sin.

Romans 1 suggests that God is revealed to ALL men, yet some men suppress the Truth… This seems to imply all of humanity CAN know God. Now one might ask how it’s possible that a sinful dead man can know God? Well, Romans 1:19-20 seems to address this quite well… “For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them.” “For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.”

But what about our totally depraved condition? Personally, I think the total depravity/inability argument is far fetched!

Whether or not man deep down knows God doesn’t really relate to total depravity. Great Calvinists such as Cornelius Van Til and Greg Bahnsen both stressed the fact that all men know of God and yet sinfully suppress that knowledge. It is to that suppressed knowledge that they attempt to appeal when they use their presuppositional apologetics and transcendental proof of God.

But it’s clear than men can do “good”. Isaiah even acknowledged men doing “good”; he just considered their good works worthless attempts at pleasing God… Isaiah 64:6

Precisely! Man can and still does “good” despite his fallenness. However, as you said even those “good” works are worthless attempts at pleasing God. So then we agree that natural man can do no work that pleases God. It follows, then, that the natural man cannot believe by his own volition, because this would be an act pleasing to God, and we have already established that the non-Christian cannot please God.

See also —> Luke 6:33 “If you do “good” to those who do “good” to you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners do the same.”

My thoughts are Romans is a comparative passage which suggests man’s righteousness is filthy compared to God’s holiness

I agree, though I don’t think this really touches on total depravity.

In Romans 3:10-12, Paul is communicating our need for a Savior. In doing this, he says “the only rightness that matters is perfect righteousness, the righteousness required by God.” Now I think you’d miss Paul’s point to argue man is unable to do “good” things. That’s why I said the passage was comparative – compared to God’s required righteousness we miss the mark by a lot since God requires perfection.

Again I agree. None of our works can bring us our own salvation. And yet we must wake ourselves from death in sin and believe? Of course not! “For this reason I have said to you, that no one can come to Me unless it has been granted him from the Father.” (John 6:65)

Our inability to do anything that is truly “good” in God’s eyes necessarily means that we cannot repent by our own will.

I don’t think for a moment Paul was interested in communicating man’s inability to do a good thing.

Whether or not we can do anything that appears “good” to man is a moot point. Paul and Isaiah clearly state that there is no one that naturally seeks after God. No one.

Scripture needs to be interpreted in light of scripture.

I agree.

God calls and man can respond. The idea of total inability is completely contrived. Ought implies can!

So if I were to go to the store and say, “I ought to buy that shirt,” does this mean I can? It may, but there could be other factors. I may be without money in which case despite the fact that I ought to buy that shirt does not mean that I can buy that shirt.

Furthermore, there exists the argument which Martin Luther famously made against Arasmus of Rotterdam in his book, “On The Bondage of the Will.” Luther quite cogently demonstrated that when we are dead in sin our will is most certainly not “free.” (In this context, Luther defined “free will” as being the ability to choose between two options without an prior disposition towards them.) When we are dead in sin, Luther argued, our will is tied to sin and we cannot do anything but sin. It is only until after we have been freed from sin that we have anything near a “free” will.

In response

I got an interesting comment from my blog today. It was really quite interesting to read but the author didn’t leave a name or email address. Hopefully he/she will read this.

Many critics of the Christian faith will argue that if God has foreknowledge, humans have no free actions. To put it simply, if God foreknows I will do x, I cannot freely refrain from doing x. This argument (known as fatalism) says that if I could refrain from doing x, I falsify God’s belief. William Lane Craig illustrates the fallacy of this argument well. I’ll try to keep it brief.

To be picky, the belief that God foreordains or predestines all things is closer to determinism than fatalism. As a Christian, I hold this view (that all things are predestined by God).

The error is the assumption that if God foreknows something it must happen. It should be restated that if God foreknows something it will happen. If x does not happen, we have not falsified God’s foreknowledge—only shown it to be different. In the case that x does not happen, God would not have foreknown x.

In what way does God foreknow? Does he see our choices ahead of time? If so, then our choices are predetermined by what God foreknew and we are still left without free will.

For example, if God foreknows I will eat a chipotle burrito on Saturday afternoon, the fatalist will say I cannot refrain from eating a chipotle burrito Saturday afternoon, because if I do so, I prove God wrong. But this is not the case. If I refrain from eating the chipotle burrito Saturday afternoon, God was not mistaken, but rather He did not foreknow my eating a chipotle burrito Saturday afternoon. Instead, God foreknew I would not eat it.

You seem to be picking more at the concept of perfectly knowing God’s foreknowledge.

Let us suppose for the sake of argument that we have an infallible revelation from God which says you will eat a chipotle burrito on Saturday afternoon. We would both agree that God cannot be wrong, so the only option is that you will eat a chipotle burrito on Saturday afternoon. God may have merely “passively seen” your eating of the burrito, but he passively saw it before it happened so that when the situation presented itself you would, without any doubt, eat that burrito. Did you have a choice? You certainly appeared to, but ultimately and unfailingly you would eat that burrito on Saturday afternoon. There was no other option.

I’m not sure what Craig means when he says free events are logically prior to God’s foreknowledge of them. It also seems to me that the chronological order is of the utmost importance in this discussion.

So it is completely coherent to say that those who God foreknows are saved, are predestined by way of His knowledge being infallible. This in no way relieves us of our freedom to respond to God.

So they are predestined to salvation because God foreknew they would be saved and they are saved because they were predestined to salvation because God foreknew they would be saved and they are saved because…

The subjectivity of objective proof (part 1)

Our worldview has an extreme impact on how we live. Everything which we experience in life will be interpreted in terms of our underlying assumptions. Those assumptions (or presuppositions) are not justified prior to holding them, but rather they must be show to be rationally held within the worldview after it has been established. Those same assumptions also guide how we view evidences. If one holds to a supernatural worldview, then the supernatural is certainly allowable in the world. If, however, one holds to a natural worldview then all things must necessarily be the cause of natural forces. Therefore, differences between interpretations of evidence will ultimately come down to our own worldview.

Knowing this, it seems curious to say the least that it is possible to speak of the “objective” proof of something. Our worldview will taint everything which we believe. In fact, our worldview is ultimately the very thing to which we must appeal when we seek to prove something. To take it even a step further, it is impossible to ultimately prove anything non-circularly because statements of fact can (and will) be brought down to the basic level of from where we derive knowledge (our ultimate epistemic authority). And this must, necessarily, appeal back to our own worldview.

We may suppose that simple things such as arithmetic proofs can be proven objectively. After all, who can object to the idea that 1 + 1 = 2? That simple concept, though, requires that we assume many things, such as the universality of logic, the persistent nature of logic, the objectivity (assuming such a thing exists, which begs the question) of logic, the existence of abstract concepts, the ability to trust our own senses, etc. And all those things must come from our own worldview.

(I should note here that while objective proof is impossible, this does not mean that objective truth is similarly impossible or non-existent. Objective truth certainly exists; however, it cannot be proven outside its own worldview.)

Knowing this, how can anything be proven? Quite simply, it cannot. Nothing can be proven unless the parties debating agree upon certain premises (common ground) or both parties share the same worldview. Going from philosophy to apologetics (which are not at all far separated), the question becomes: how do we debate with unbelievers regarding the objective truth of God if objective proof is not possible? Do believers and unbelievers truly have common ground? Does common ground even exist in the debate regarding the existence of God?

This is getting too long so I think I’ll just post this one part first.

The Role of Logic in Theology

In a recent debate between myself and another Calvinist on CGR on whether or not God predestines sin, the question has been raised of whether or not logic based on Scripture is allowable and reliable. Historically, Reformed thought has been very much divided on this issue. One of the most well known reformers, Martin Luther, did not believe logic to be reliable. He even went so far as to declare that reason was the enemy of the Christian faith and that faith must, at every turn, crush reason beneath its feet. John Calvin, even, was very hesitant to use logic to extend his theology beyond the Bible’s explicit teachings. (Subsequently, this is why many have claimed that Calvin was not nearly as “Calvinistic” as some of his modern-day students.)

Meanwhile, other Reformed theologians such as Cornelius Van Til, Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, and Gordon Clark have believed that logic is perfectly valid as long as the believer has the proper epistemology (epistemology is defined as the theory of knowledge). It probably comes as little surprise that this is the side with which I agree.

Key to presuppositional apologetics is the concept of Reformed (which is, ultimately, Christian) epistemology; that is to say, the philosophical study of the nature of knowledge within Christian theism. (I should note that when I speak of Reformed epistemology, I am not speaking of the Reformed epistemology advocated by Alvin Plantinga.) There are two keys points which Reformed epistemology states.

First, Reformed epistemology states that the final arbiter of truth (definitionally, the final judge of truth) is not the creation but rather the Creator. When the two conflict in matters of truth claims, the Creator will always be right. Second, Reformed epistemology states that the Bible is the divine revelation of that final arbiter of truth to His creation. As the divine revelation of the final arbiter, it is, by extension, the revelation of the final truth. This cannot be over-emphasized: the Bible must always be the final judge of truth.

Now, according to Reformed epistemology, the laws of logic exist as a reflection of God. God is, necessarily and by nature, a logical God; He cannot deny Himself (law of non-contradiction) and is immutable (logical consistency). Therefore, we see that indeed logic, a reflection of God’s nature, exists necessarily because God exists.

Knowing all this background, it should begin to make sense as to why I believe logic should certainly be allowed in theology. As long as the believer does not believe himself to be the final arbiter of truth, then it is rational and reasonable to use logic in theology.

A common complaint that those opposed to the use of logic raise is that ultimately those who use logic exalt it as the authority above the Bible. Plainly, though, under the Reformed epistemic system, this can never be the case because doing so would mean divorcing one’s self from the entire Biblical epistemic system. In short, logic must always be in submission to the Bible and changing that order of authority asserts that the believer knows better than God.

Now, the question is raised of how far we may take logic in the study of the Biblical God. Obviously, we must use logic to a certain extent to derive our beliefs so at this point the question becomes, “How much we allow ourselves to extrapolate?” Those opposed to the use of logic in this manner would say that extrapolating too much destroys the need for faith and results in heretical beliefs. A classic example would be the beliefs of Modalists or Oneness Pentecostals. Modalists and Oneness theology claim that God is one person with three separate personalities (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). A key argument which they (Oneness and Modalists) use is that the traditional Trinitarian view contradicts logic and is, therefore, invalid. Note, though, that in declaring that view, they divorce themselves from Biblical epistemology. They presume that there is a final decider of truth outside of the Bible. If the Bible does not appear to be logical, they assert, then the fault must be in the Bible and not us.

Furthermore, how are differences between interpretations resolved but by logic? Ultimately, all of our Biblical beliefs are based on our ability to derive truth via logic from the Bible. Our faith can never be completely free of logic.

In short, my point is this: the use of logic is very valid in theology; in fact, it is a requirement for any study of theology. However, believers must be careful not to reason as though they and their (presumed) rational mind is the final authority. In other words, we must not let our logic “correct” the Bible, but rather the other way around. When logic says one thing and the Bible says another, the Bible always wins.

Now I’m put in an interesting position. A few posts ago, I declared that, “I’d love to believe total inerrancy but cannot honestly do so now.” For anyone who cares, consider this a formal retraction of that statement. Perhaps in my next post I’ll take the time to write a refutation of my argument.

My ultimate fideism

I had an interesting mini-dialogue with my dad a while back that touched on fideism (which, btw, is not pronounced as it looks). In essence, he does not like the hymn “He Lives” which says, “You ask me how I know He lives / He lives within my heart.” He believes that is a shallow answer and while I initially agreed with him, it seems to me there is more to it than that. As I study the Reformed faith, it seems to me that that is my (in fact, all believer’s) ultimate reason for belief: I believe because God has chosen to make me believe. (Yes, it is essentially a Calvinist thing, but because I believe Christianity is Calvinism, it applies for all Christians.)

For that reason, I am ultimately a fideist. I believe because of God; I do not appeal to an extra-Christian authority to prove my faith. Yet, at the same time, I do not believe fideism is a good defense for “the hope that is in us.” (1 Peter 3:15) Fideism is our ultimate reason; it is not our ultimate defense.

Our ultimate defense, I believe, should be the presuppositional and transcendental argument for the existence of God (hereby referred to as PA and the TAG). Entire books have been written on why PA and the TAG are necessitated Biblically, yet that is not the immediate reason I prefer PA and TAG. I prefer them because the three other major apologetics methods (classical, evidential, and fideism [if you could even call it an apologetic method]) tend to prove a generic deity, not necessarily the Christian God, while PA seeks to exclusively prove Christian theism.

Transcendental arguments and the role of presuppositional apologetics

A transcendental argument is an argument that claims Y is the necessary precondition for X, and since X is true, Y must also be true. We do not directly question Y (because its truth can be determined through X), but rather the valid question is whether or not Y is truly the necessary precondition for X or if there a thing besides Y which could also fit the role of the required precondition.

To further illustrate transcendental arguments, I give the transcendental argument that if any pan of brownies are good, then Bob must have made them. My positive statement, then, is that the brownies in question taste good because Bob made them. I do not question whether or not the brownies are truly good-tasting, but rather, is Bob the only one capable of making good-tasting brownies? If someone else is capable of making good brownies, then my argument fails terribly. One of the other good brownie-makers could have made the brownies; it does not necessitate Bob. If, though, I can prove that Bob is the only one capable of making good brownies, and the brownies are good, then I have transcendentally proven Bob made the brownies.

Now, if you return to the previous definition of the transcendental argument, and replace Y with “God” and X with “the universality of logic, rationality, and morals,” you arrive at the transcendental argument for God. God must existence because he is the necessary precondition for universality. In other words, God exists because of the impossibility of the contrary: if God did not exist, universal concepts could not exist. I should note that most philosophers would insist that transcendental proofs should only be used when the object in question (i.e., a transcendent God) cannot be proven using traditional methods (i.e., science, logic, etc.). Some philosophers will even go so far as to claim that transcendental proofs are only truly valid when there are only two choices (a dichotomy) in order to simplify the argument and prevent it from resorting to an appeal to probability. In this context, the two choices are Christian theism and anything else (atheism, deism, pantheism, polytheism, and all other monotheistic beliefs).

The presuppositional argument is that the God which is transcendentally proven is the Christian God because all other epistemic systems are internally inconsistent and/or incoherent. Generally speaking, presuppositional arguments involve a critique of the opposing worldview’s epistemology and metaphysics.

From there, the presuppositional apologist shows why the Christian God is that necessary precondition and how the opposing system in question fails. Presuppositional apologists are quick to point out that converting the other debater is not the true aim of their apologetic (that, they say, is up to God to do, and may or may not be a result of the debate) but rather their aim is to tear down “arguments and every lofty opinion raised against the knowledge of God.” (2 Corinthians 10:5)

At the very least, PA and the TAG get bonus points for being the most philosophically interesting arguments.

Proof of Spiderman’s truth

With help from tonight’s youth lesson, I have formulated the proof of the truth of spiderman: because it references true, historically proven places (mainly, New York City), it must be true. Now, I must say, this isn’t quite complete enough. If, though, I found some old prophecies (it doesn’t really matter where they come from, so long as they are old and not too vague) and wrote a Spiderman which fulfilled those, I would have my complete proof. Yes, that would indeed show once and for all that Spiderman is true.

On a completely unrelated note, next week in youth we will learn how the “Lord, Liar, Lunatic” trichotomy tries to prove Jesus was God. It (the LLL trichotomy) originated from C. S. Lewis’ Mere Christianity where Lewis argued that it is impossible for Jesus to merely have been a good moral teacher. He asserted that his teachings negate the possibility that Jesus was a liar or lunatic. If his trichotomy was true, then the only possibility is that Jesus was Lord. Unfortunately for Lewis, though, those are not the only options. From an objective point of view, the other possibilities include: Jesus never said, did, or claimed what he did but rather he was lied about by the Gospel writers; Jesus never existed; or he was a brilliant, though slightly deranged man (mental problems hardly mean lunacy).

I sure hope no one bases their apologetic approach on this book.